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Pooled regressions first of 8 and then of 16 countries show a steady and robust process of 
endogenous growth since 1870, interrupted only by the events of World War II and the impact 
of  convergence towards US levels of performance in the 1950s and the 1960s. This result 
contrasts with that of Maurice Scott, who finds that growth accelerated after the second world 
war. Catching up is no longer relevant in the 70s and the 80s of this century, despite a still 
existing gap in productivity levels vis a vis the US. It was neither relevant in the pre-WW II era. 
Growth is therefore characterized by the device "back to normal". Even so, a few countries 
underperform in terms of economic growth.  
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Non-technical summary 
 
In neoclassical growth theory diminishing returns with respect to capital accumulation imply 
that the long-run rate of economic growth is independent of the macroeconomic savings ratio. 
Endogenous  growth  theories  show  how  diminishing  returns  can  be  counterbalanced  by 
externalities  or  internalities  so  that  long-run  growth  of  output  depends  on  intertemporal 
preferences.  There  is  now  a  large  variety  of  models  along  these  lines,  each  emphasizing 
particular  aspects  of  accumulation  and  innovation.  Maurice  Scott  takes  a  short-cut  by 
postulating a fundamental growth equation relating output growth to the investment ratio and 
the growth rate of employment. Empirical testing of the theory is facilitated by approximating 
the fundamental growth equation by a linear relationship. If growth is fully engodenous the 
constant term in this linear equation should be equal to zero. 
 
In this paper we want to investigate two main questions. First, is growth endogenous in the 
sense that the investment ratio and the rate of growth of employment explain differences in 
growth of output across countries and across time periods satisfactorily? Second, is there histori-
cal continuity or are there indications that growth has accelerated after major events such as for 
instance WW I and WW II? To answer these questions regressions are run on a sample of 
observations borrowed from Maddison. The period of observation is 1870-1989 and the number 
of countries is eigth in the core sample and 16 in an extended sample. Because countries differ 
with respect to the level of knowledge applied in producing goods, as may be inferred from 
differences in labour productivity, international spillovers may lead to catching up. This can be 
accounted  for  by  introducing  as  an  additional  explanatory  variable  the  ratio  of  labour 
productivity of followers to that of the leader, which is the US for most of the time. 
 
Pooling of time-series and cross-section data gives a core sample of 57 observations. Pooling 
calls for testing of stability with respect to sub-periods and countries. The tests reveal that 
country-specific influences can only be assigned to Australia. More important, it is found that 
the  catch-up  variable  is  insignificant  in  the sub-periods before 1950 and after 1973. These 
results  still  hold  (with  an  additional  dummy  for  the  Scandinavian  countries)  in  case  the 
Maddison sample is extended to 84 observations. Moreover, in all cases considered the constant 
term does not differ significantly from zero. It may therefore be concluded that endogenous  
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growth theory stands up to the facts. Historical continuity is observed if proper account is taken 
of the catch-up process in the 1950s and the 1960s. These periods are exceptional as they show 
a conditional convergence towards US productivity levels. After 1973 catching up is no longer 
significant and the industrialised countries are back on their pre-WW II historical track. The 
productivity slowdown observed since 1973 fits well into the picture. It should be noted that the 
idea of historical continuity contrasts with Scott, who finds an acceleration of growth after WW 
II. However, as shown in the paper this may be due to a rather special treatment of catching up 
in the post-war period. 
 
The  core  sample  with  data  starting  at  the  second  industrial  revolution  which  according  to 
Chandler started around 1870, includes a limited number of countries. Consistent pre-WW II 
data are hard to obtain. Missing data are of course no excuse for a selection bias, if there is 
reason to believe that this critique applies. However, Bradford de Long's critical assessment of 
the convergence hypothesis does not apply to our analysis. We find no convergence before WW 
II, and there is no a priori reason to assume that countries not included in the sample would 
have performed badly in terms of our fundamental growth equation. On the contrary, our results 
are robust as appears from estimating the growth equation using Summers and Heston data on 
post WW II-growth in 95 countries and three sub-periods. The total number of observations is 
now 245 as data for some countries are limited to the periods after 1960. The results confirm 
our main conclusions: endogenous growth theories fit the facts rather well and catching up is no 
longer an issue after 1973. The impact of the catch-up variable in the larger Summers and 
Heston sample is smaller than in the Maddison samples, as may be expected. As Abramovitz 
and Inkster, among others, have pointed out catching up requires adequate preconditions in 
terms of culture and institutions to be effective. Homogeneity in this sense is, of course, less in a 
large sample of 95 countries than in the much smaller Maddison country set. 
 
The idea of a normal pattern of growth is reminiscent of the well-known normal pattern of 
sectoral development introduced by Chenery and Syrguin. Future research may explore this 
similarity by analysing growth at a sectoral level, applying the ideas developed in this paper.  
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  On the Historical Continuity of the Process of Economic Growth 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
From an empirical point of view economic growth is usually seen as a long-run process. Growth 
is conceived of as the trend in GDP over a substantial time span. Therefore, to explain growth 
by econometric techniques, one needs data for a large number of countries to apply cross-
section analysis. The equation estimated contains the growth rate of GDP either in total or per 
capita as the dependent variable and a number of explanatory variables based on economic 
theory. There are basically two strategies that can be followed. First, the estimated equation may 
be derived from a theory of economic growth (e.g. Dowrick and Nguyen, 1989; Barro and Sala-
i-Martin, 1992; Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992). Second, a pool of explanatory variables, 
which come from different macroeconomic theories, may be considered assuming that they can 
be entered independently and linearly (e.g. Kormendi and Meguire, 1985; Grier and Tullock, 
1989; Barro, 1991; Levine and Renelt, 1992). In the latter case it is useful to sort out variables 
that really matter. As shown by Levine and Renelt (1992) by applying cross-section analysis for 
the period 1960-1989 to a sample of about 100 countries, the number of robust explanatory 
variables with respect to real per capita GDP is rather limited. 
 
This paper looks at economic growth as a process of the medium as well as the long run. In 
studying growth, one has to eliminate the business cycle, but there is no compelling reason to 
assume that differences in growth rates across sub-periods must be averaged out to get the right 
picture. Therefore, the aim here is not only to show why growth rates differ between countries 
but also to investigate whether growth accelerates or decelerates over time. More specifically, 
we want to investigate whether there is historical continuity with respect to economic growth. 
Can economic growth before and after WW II be explained by the same growth equation? This 
approach calls for pooling cross-sectional data and time series data, going back in history as far 
as the availability of statistical sources allows. The equation estimated for this purpose is based 
on the growth theory of Scott (1989). The resulting equation is rather simple and could have 
been postulated right away, as implied by the results of Levine and Renelt (1992). However, for  
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a proper understanding of the estimation results it seems desirable to make a short theoretical 
detour in section 2. The data, estimation procedures and statistical tests are dealt with in section 
3, while the results of the regressions are discussed in section 4. The paper closes with some 
observations on the follow-up in our research programme. 
 
2.  Endogenous versus exogenous growth theory 
 
Endogenous growth theories such as that of Scott (1989) intend to explain growth including 
technological progress, while exogenous theories leave room for an unexplained residual. The 
difference  between  these  views  can  be  illustrated  by  comparing  Scott's  theory  with  the 
neoclassical approach of Dowrick and Nguyen (1989), and Dowrick (1992). 
 
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas specification, the neoclassical production function can be written in 
rates of change as 
where g, gk and gΡ denote the growth rate of output, capital input and labour input, respectively. 
The parameter α stands for the production elasticity of capital. Technological change is constant 
and is equal to 100ε percent per year. Applying equation (1) to a cross section of countries leads 
to unsatisfactory results because total factor productivity varies substantially across regions. A 
way out is to assume that technological knowledge converges in the sense that countries with 
lower GDP per capita but broadly similar socio-economic characteristics catch up with the 
leader, which is the US in the 20th century. Equation (1) may therefore be extended by introdu-
cing a catch-up variable (cu) in the form of the ratio of the initial level of labour productivity in 
each country in the sample (y0) and the initial labour productivity level in the US (yus) (cu/ 
y0/yus.) 
 
The introduction of a catch-up variable gives rise to additional observations. First, as argued by 
Inkster (1990), who supplied ample historical evidence for his view, the international transfer of 
knowledge is an ongoing process with countries exchanging ideas, hardware and skilled people 
on a bilateral base. If countries differ substantially in their level of development, transfers from 
"leaders" to "latecomers" may dominate, thus giving rise to catch up, which can be identified by 
  ,   +   g ) - (1   +   g   =   g k ε α α l   (1)  
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econometric methods. Second, a substantial difference in GDP per capita is a necessary but not 
a sufficient condition for catching up. In addition, the social and economic environment of the 
receiver  should  be  similar  to  that  of  the  source  for  the  technology  transfer  to  be  fully 
"indigenised"  and  therefore  successful  (e.g.  Ambramovitz  1989;  Inkster,  1990).  Adding  a 
logarithmic catch-up variable and making the necessary transformations, Dowrick and Nguyen 
(1989) end up with the estimation equation 
where µ denotes a random error term and the positive defined coefficients a0, a1, a2 and a3 
depend  on  the  parameters  of  the  original  production  function,  a  coefficient  introduced  to 
account for the impact of the catch-up variable, and the length of the time period (T) for which 
growth rates are defined. Intuitively, one would expect the absolute extent of catch up to be 
stronger in the earlier years, so that the coefficient a3 diminishes if T increases. There is a 
similar  impact  on  the  other  coefficients.  More  specifically,  as  shown  by  the  authors,  the 
coefficient on the growth of capital a1 is an underestimate of the Cobb-Douglas parameter α. 
Finally, it should be noted that because of missing estimates for the capital stock, the Harrod 
Domar identity gk=σ/κ is substituted in equation (1), with the share of investment in output 
denoted by σ and the capital-output coefficient denoted by κ. (Depreciation of capital is ignored 
to  simplify  the  argument.)  In  estimating  equation  (2)  the  authors  have  to assume that κ is 
constant, which is inconsistent from a theoretical perspective. 
 
The theory of endogenous growth of Scott (1989, 1991, 1993) is based on learning by doing and 
learning  by  watching.  This  places  Scott's  theory  in  line  with  endogenous  growth  theories 
developed independently (e.g. Romer, 1986). In Scott's theory, firms are conceived of as on-
going concerns with sunk costs determining their position at each point in time. They have to 
decide  how  much  will  be  invested  to  change  the  existing  facilities  and  organizational 
capabilities and how much labour will be hired or fired compared with the volume of labour 
applied  to  run  existing  operations.  In  other  words,  firms  have  to  decide  on  the  volume  of 
investment and the direction of technical progress simultaneously. In case of rationalisation, 
emphasis is put on labour saving, while in case of expansionary investment, labour demand will 
usually increase. Growth is never a repetition of the old but implies qualitative change as firms 
  µ σ
κ
  +   cu n a   -   g a   +   a   +   a   =   g 3 2
1
0 l l   (2)  
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cumulate  knowledge  by  investing. Every act of investment induces a change in production 
capacity as well as a rise in the stock of existing knowledge, which can be tapped later on. As 
Scott (1993) states it: "There are no diminishing returns to cumulative investment, because 
changing the world reveals fresh opportunities" (italics our own). Note that Scott uses a broad 
investment concept, including expenditure on R&D, outlays on organizational changes, some 
forms of advertising and the like. In this respect Scott's view parallels that of Chandler (1990), 
who points to the importance of "three-pronged investment" in the history of economic growth: 
(1) investment in production facilities large enough to achieve cost advantages of scale and 
scope; (2) investment in product-specific marketing, distribution and purchasing networks; (3) 
recruiting and organising of managers to coordinate and supervise production and distribution. 
With such a broad investment concept there is a measurement problem. However, as argued by 
Scott  (1989,  pp.  30-33),  gross  investment  can  be  taken  as  a  proxy  for  the  true  amount  of 
investment because the omission of the outlays on R&D, marketing and improvement of the 
organisation, etc., is counterbalanced by the inclusion in the definition of gross investment of 
some expenditures that should be classified as "maintenance" instead of as true replacement 
investment.  Maintenance and  repair should be considered as current costs of production to 
prevent or offset physical deterioration of existing assets
2. 
 
The options for firms can thus be summarised by a fundamental growth equation 
where the symbols have the same meaning as before. Forward-looking firms maximise the 
present  value  of  the  cash  flow  for  given  time  paths  of  wages,  prices  and  interest  rates. 
Depending on these time paths economic growth will be predominantly expansionary, requiring 
additional labour to realize plans, or more defensive, rationalizing on variable labour input. The 
theory  bears  a  certain  resemblance  to  the  model  of  Kamien  and  Schwartz  (1969),  which 
combines the Kennedy-Weizsäcker innovation possibility frontier with the idea that investment 
expenditure can shift this frontier outward
3. 
 
There are three additional observations to be made. First, Scott's growth equation is concave in 
σ and gΡ, but when the curves are relatively flat a linear approximation may be acceptable in 
empirical  work.  Second,  learning  can  be  internal  to  the  firm  or  can  take  the  form  of  an 
  0 < f , f   0, > f , f    , ) g , f(   =   g 22 11 2 1 l σ   (3)  
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externality. The theory can cope with externalities on a microeconomic level. The macroeco-
nomic growth equation relates internal as well as external effects to gross investment as the 
primary engine of growth. Third, the growth equation may shift under the impact of special 
circumstances.  The  post  WW  II  situation  in  developed  countries  provided  an  almost  ideal 
situation to imitate superior American ways of producing and distributing commodities. For this 
reason a catch-up variable as in Dowrick and Nguyen (1989) should be added for relevant 
periods
4. The equation to be estimated can therefore be written as 
where µ is a random error term and the constant b0 is predicted to be zero, because technological 
change is fully endogenous in the model. In some studies convergence or catch up is measured 
by including initial GDP per capita instead of cu as an explanatory variable (e.g. Dowrick, 
1992).  This  destroys  the  dimensional  homogeneity  of  the  estimation  equation,  so  that  the 
constant term cannot be interpreted as a pure measure for exogenous technological change. 
Consequently, Scott's theory of endogenous growth, implying that the constant term equals zero, 
cannot be properly tested. Equations (2) and (4) look similar, but the underlying theories differ 
substantially. Moreover, there is no need in Scott's theory to assume that the capital-output ratio 
is constant, because there is no need for a static neoclassical production function in the theory of 
economic growth. It should be noted that except for deviations caused by business cycles or 
temporary changes in X-efficiency for whatever reason, equation (4) applies for each sub-period 
within the entire period of observation
5. There are no transitional dynamics apart from catching 
up,  as  is  also  true  for  some  other  macroeconomic  models  of  endogenous  growth  with 
encompassing concepts of capital accumulation (e.g. Romer, 1986; Rebelo, 1991).  
 
3.  Estimation: data, procedure and statistical tests 
 
For all 16 countries the data on GDP and employment levels come from Maddison (1991). In 
the core sample the investment ratios are from Maddison (1992)
6. The investment series covers 
eight countries, which constrains the pool of observations of the core sample. Elimination of 
cyclical fluctuations is performed by calculating average exponential growth rates of output and 
labour input from peak to peak level
7. Maddison reports employment levels for 1870, 1890, 
  ,   +   cu n b   -   g b   +   b   +   b   =   g 3 2 1 0 µ σ l l   (4)  
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1913, 1929, 1938, 1950, 1960, 1973 and 1989. For most countries these years show peaks in the 
level of output, so that it is justified to use them for this purpose. It is therefore possible to split 
the observation period (1870-1989) into eight subperiods. Thus, in principle, the core sample 
consists of 64 observations. The series for Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada and the 
United States covers the whole period from 1870 onwards. Data are missing, however, for 
Germany,  Japan,  France  and  the  Netherlands  for  the  "war  period"  1938-1950,  whereas  the 
Japanese series starts in 1890 and the Dutch series starts in 1913. This reduces the core sample 
to 57 observations. Contrary to Scott (1989), the observations are not weighted for country size 
or reliability. The growth rate of labour input is captured by two different measures: man-hours 
and persons. For the investment ratio, we take the mean value of annual observations. The 
catch-up variable is defined as GDP per man-hour (respectively per person) relative to (corres-
ponding) labour productivity in the US. 
 
The core sample of g, σ, gℓ and cu recapitulates briefly the medium- and long-run tendencies in 
capitalist development
8. Since 1870, all 8 countries have been involved in a process of substan-
tial growth measured in hours
9. Output growth amounted to 3.3% a year on average, whereas 
employment, measured in hours, grew by 0.7%, and measured in persons by 1.2% a year. The 
average  investment  ratio was  13.4.  Apart  from  inter-country  differences,  output  and labour 
productivity growth have varied significantly over time. Compared with the inter-war era, all 
countries experienced an acceleration in the 1950s and the 1960s. After 1973, there has been a 
substantial and general deceleration, but not dramatic compared with pre WW I evidence. 
 
Estimation proceeds as follows. First, we tested the significance of country-specific factors by 
introducing country dummies. Stability over time of the coefficient of the investment ratio and 
the constant term was tested by adding dummies for all sub-periods with the exception of the 
1950s and the 1960s. Stability over time of the coefficient of the catch-up variable was tested 
for all sub-periods. The test reveals that country-specific influences can only be assigned to 
Australia and that the coefficient of the investment ratio is stable over time, with the exception 
of the "war period" 1938-1950. Further, it appears that the catch-up variable is insignificant in 
the periods before 1950 and after 1973. This is illustrated by the equation in Table 1, where 
labour input growth is measured in man-hours. The catch-up variable is highly significant in the 
sub-periods 1950-1960 and 1960-1973. For all other sub-periods the catch-up variable can be  
 





Test on the significance of the catch-up variable, 1870-1989 
OLS estimation of output growth g on 
  Coefficient  t-value 
Constant   0.35   0.72 
Investment ratio (σ)   0.13   2.95 
Growth rate of labour input (gℓ)
*   0.87   8.93 
Catch up (ℓncu1870)  -0.09  -0.12 
Catch up (ℓncu1890)  -0.13  -0.31 
Catch up (ℓncu1913)  -0.58  -1.41 
Catch up (ℓncu1929)  -0.14  -0.35 
Catch up (ℓncu1938)  -1.74  -1.08 
Catch up (ℓncu1950)  -2.32  -6.18 
Catch up (ℓncu1960)  -3.38  -5.64 
Catch up (ℓncu1973)  -0.22  -0.23 
σDummy1938-1950   0.16   2.49 
σDummyAustralia  -0.06  -2.71 
Number of observations (N)  57   
R-Bar-Squared  0.86   
* Measured in hours worked.  
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Table 2 
Pooled regression with labour input in man-hours, 1870-1989 
OLS estimation of output growth g on         
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Constant   0.34   0.39    0.79    0.50 
  (0.73)  (1.00)   (2.79)   (1.73) 
Investment ratio (σ)   0.14   0.14    0.10    0.13 
  (3.46)  (4.33)   (4.78)   (5.82) 
Growth rate of labour input (gℓ)   0.83   0.83    0.85    0.81 
  (9.04)  (9.57)  (11.37)  (11.26) 
Catch up 1950-1960 (ℓncu1950)  -2.19  -2.22   -2.02   -2.03 
  (6.37)  (7.10)   (9.16)   (9.64) 
Catch up 1960-1973 (ℓncu1960)  -3.13  -3.19   -3.37   -3.27 
  (5.76)  (7.07)  (11.42)  (11.58) 
Catch up 1973-1989 (ℓncu1973)   0.19       
  (0.21)       
σDummy1938-1950   0.21   0.21    0.20    0.21 
  (5.13)  (5.18)   (5.14)   (5.55) 
σDummyAustralia  -0.06  -0.06   -0.05   -0.06 
  (3.09)  (3.11)   (2.89)   (3.42) 
σDummyScandinavia          -0.04 
          (2.98) 
Number of observations (N)  57  57   84   84 
R-Bar-Squared   0.87   0.87    0.86    0.87 
S.E. of Regression   0.72   0.71    0.69    0.66 
Serial Correlation (F-statistic)   0.16   0.17    0.04    0.62 
Functional Form (F-statistic)   1.18   1.25    0.00    0.37 
Heteroscedasticity (F-statistic)   0.20   0.22    0.06    0.00  
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Table 3 
Pooled regression with labour input in persons, 1870-1989 
OLS estimation of output growth g on         
  (1A)  (2A)  (3A)  (4A) 
Constant  -0.07  -0.13     0.20   -0.09 
  (0.15)  (0.33)    (0.68)   (0.32) 
Investment ratio (σ)   0.11   0.12     0.09    0.13 
  (2.68)  (3.68)    (4.23)   (5.44) 
Growth rate of labour input (gℓ)   1.07   1.06     1.09    1.05 
  (8.36)  (8.89)   (11.03)  (11.09) 
Catch up 1950-1960 (ℓncu1950)  -2.77  -2.73    -2.60   -2.59 
  (6.95)  (7.53)   (10.46)  (11.02) 
Catch up 1960-1973 (ℓncu1960)  -3.72  -3.62    -3.54   -3.44 
  (5.60)  (6.51)   (10.15)  (10.41) 
Catch up 1973-1989 (ℓncu1973)  -0.30         
  (0.28)         
σDummy1938-1950   0.14   0.14     0.13    0.14 
  (3.15)  (3.23)    (3.21)   (3.63) 
σDummyAustralia  -0.07  -0.07    -0.07   -0.07 
  (3.39)  (3.43)    (3.42)   (4.03) 
σDummyScandinavia           -0.04 
           (3.22) 
Number of observations (N)  57  57    84    84 
R-Bar-Squared   0.86   0.86     0.85    0.88 
S.E. of Regression   0.76   0.75     0.71    0.67 
Serial Correlation (F-statistic)   0.47   0.45     0.09    1.50 
Functional Form (F-statistic)   0.84   0.74     0.01    0.10 
Heteroscedasticity (F-statistic)   0.28   0.31     0.01    0.67  
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The equations (1) in Table 2 and (1A) in Table 3 summarise the regression results after elimina-
tion  of  insignificant  variables
10.  However,  the  post  1973  catch-up  variable  is  shown  to 
emphasize one of our main conclusions: catching up after 1973 is not significant. Deletion of 
this insignificant explanatory variable hardly changes the results as can be seen by comparing 
the equations (1) and (2) in Table 2 and the equations (1A) and (2A) in Table 3. Labour input 
growth is measured by man-hours (1) and persons (1A) respectively. Absolute t-statistics are 
shown in brackets
11. Joint tests of zero restrictions on the coefficients of the deleted dummy 
variables yield F-values below the critical F-value at a 5% significance level. The remaining 
variables appear to be robust in the sense defined by Levine and Renelt (1992). The t-statistics 
show that all coefficients are highly significant (at the 0.005 probability level on a one-tailed 
test), with the exception of the constant term and the catch-up variable of the period 1973-
1989
12. Additional tests indicate little or no evidence of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. 
The equations explain about 87% of the variance of the dependent variable, so that there is no 
compelling reason to introduce additional explanatory variables.
13 
 
The distinction between the Tables 2 and 3 has to do with the fact that annual hours worked per 
person have been approximately halved since 1870 (see Appendix). When hours of work are 
long, a reduction can generally be expected to result in some offsetting increase in output per 
man-hour. Scott (1989) mentions several studies showing that such an offset exists. Authors 
disagree, however, as to how much should be allowed for increased productivity as hours fall. 
That is the reason we present both tables here. The equations in Table 2 implicitly assume that 
the offset is absent, whereas the equations in Table 3 imply a complete compensation for change 
in hours. It is to be expected that the truth lies somewhere in between these extremes. As things 
stand now, statistical tests favour equation (1) over (1A)
14. 
 
It is interesting to see whether our results are robust in case the core sample is extended or the 
growth equation is fitted to observations from a different data set. First, we extended the core 
sample by including eight additional countries as in Maddison (1991, 1992): Italy, Austria, 
Belgium,  Denmark,  Finland,  Norway,  Sweden  and  Switzerland.  For  Italy,  we  used  the 
investment series of Rossi, Sorgato and Toniolo (1992), which starts in 1890
15. For the other 
countries the investment ratios are derived from the OECD National Accounts, which begin in 
1950
16. Altogether, the core sample is extended to 84 observations. The results are presented in  
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equations (3) and (4) of Table 2 and the equations (3A) and (4A) of Table 3. In equations (4) 
and (4A) a common dummy variable is applied to all Scandinavian countries. This dummy 
variable appears to be significant. Separate dummies for the Scandinavian countries give grosso 
modo the same outcome. As appears by comparing equations (2) and (4), with respectively, 
equations (2A) and (4A), the results obtained for the core sample are robust with respect to an 
extension of the sample along the lines set forth by Maddison. 
 
Second,  the  fundamental growth  equation  was  tested applying  the  post-WW  II  data  set  by 
Summers and Heston (1991). Oil producing countries were eliminated, as were small countries 
(less than 1 million inhabitants) resulting in a sample of 245 observations (95 countries and 
three time periods if available). Applying OLS results in: 
 
 g =   -0.16 + 0.12σ + 0.77gℓ - 0.79ℓncu1950 - 0.80ℓncu1960 + 0.09ℓncu1973 
        (-0.24)  (5.66)   (5.45)   (-3.41)           (-4.33)               (0.46) 
  245   =   N     , 0.25   =   R
2  
 
Absolute t-statistics are shown in brackets. Labour input is measured in persons, so that the 
result should be compared to equations (2A) and (4A) in Table 2. Here again the main results of 
our analysis stand upright: (1) technological change is endogenous; there is no indication of an 
autonomous factor; (2) catching up is limited to the fifties and sixties; there is no catch up after 
1973. The impact of the explanatory variable cu from 1950 to 1973 is less than in the Maddison 
samples, as may be expected in a sample with very heterogeneous countries. Moreover, the 
equation explains only 25% of the variance of the dependent variable. A distinction between 
different growth clubs would undoubtedly improve these results (e.g. Dowrick and Gemmell, 
1991; Dowrick, 1992). However, for our purpose there is no need to go into so much detail. 
 
The robustness of our results can also be investigated by introducing a measure of investment in 
human capital as an additional explanatory variable. Investment in human capital or schooling 
differs substantially before and after WW II and may thus explain part of the acceleration in 
economic growth from 1950-1973
17. To account for this possibility equation (4) of Table 2, 
which now includes the catch-up variable for the last sub-period, is reestimated by including a  
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proxy for human capital investment: 
 
 g =    0.17 + 0.13σ + 0.82gℓ - 2.12ℓncu1950 - 3.45ℓncu1960 - 0.47ℓncu1973 
         (0.45) (4.94)  (11.17)  (-8.81)            (-9.92)            (-0.80) 
 
      + 0.22σD38-50 - 0.05σDAus - 0.04σDScandinavia - 0.13ℓnSEC 
        (5.79)          (-2.49)         (-3.02)                  (-1.58) 
  84   =   N     , 0.87   =   R
2 2 
 
Investment in human capital is approximated by SEC, the Secondary School Enrollment Ratio 
as used by Barro (1991) and Levine and Renelt (1992)
18. It appears that our claim about the 
insignificance of the constant term (endogenous growth) and the significance of catching-up 
from 1950-1973 stands up to this additional test very well. The human capital variable ΡnSEC is 
not statistically significant at the 10% level and does not improve the overall fit of the equation. 
For this reason we do not go further into the subject. 
 
4.  Discussion of the results 
 
As appears from regression equation (2) in Table 2 we found the process of economic growth to 
be steady over eight countries and eight distinct sub-periods since 1870, interrupted only by 
some events like WW II and the impact of convergence towards the US in productivity and 
lifestyle during the fifties and sixties. As observed before, the explained variance of our growth 
equation (2) is 87%
19, while the coefficients on the investment ratio (0.14) and the growth rate 
of working hours (0.83) are highly significant and robust
20. The constant term does not differ 
significantly from zero, so that the hypothesis of endogenous growth cannot be rejected. 
 
The  robustness  of  the  growth  equation  over  time  and  across  countries  is  a  remarkable 
phenomenon. It points towards a normal pattern of investment and growth since the second 
industrial revolution, which started around 1870 (Chandler, 1990). As exceptions confirm the 
rule,  it  is  rewarding  to  look  at  deviations  from  the  normal  pattern.  There  are  two  minor 
deviations. First, it is evident that the period including the second world war was one of high  
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turbulance.  It  should  be  recalled  in  this  connection  that  data  for  this  period  refer  only  to 
countries which did not suffer from foreign occupation (Australia, Canada, UK, USA). The 
higher productivity of investment during this period can, therefore, be explained in terms of an 
increase in X-efficiency. Second, the growth performance of the Australian economy is below 
the mark. Although this underperformance should be studied in more detail to warrant definitive 
conclusions, our rough estimate is that the isolated geographical location, protectionist policies 




The major exception with respect to continuity in the process of economic growth was of course 
the  process  of  catching  up  vis  a  vis  the  US  economy  in  the  fifties,  which  became  even 
somewhat stronger in the sixties. As documented in Maddison (1991), Ambramovitz (1989) and 
others,  this  golden  era  of  economic  growth  in  Western  Europe  is  quite  unique.  It  is  not 
necessary to recapitulate the factors that caused this exceptional development in detail. However 
it is remarkable that catching up in the sixties was more pronounced. Post-war relocations and 
adjustments were completed by then and massive foreign investment from the US to Europe 
speeded up the transfer of technological and managerial knowledge. However, what needs to be 
stressed is that the European economies were back on the historical track after 1973. Catching 
up is no longer a relevant issue, despite a remaining gap in productivity levels compared with 
the US, as presented in the Appendix. There are at least two factors which may be of some help 
explaining  this  robust  result.  First,  catching  up  should  not  be  regarded  as  a  linear  and 
mechanical process. Before WW II, European countries like France and Germany had substan-
tially lower productivity levels than did the US, but the catch-up variable is insignificant for this 
period, as shown in section 3. This result confirms the view of Ambramovitz (1989) and Inkster 
(1990) that catching up requires adequate preconditions in terms of institutions and cultures to 
be  effective.  Moreover,  countries  may  grow  differently  by  choosing  specific  technological 
trajectories, as shown for instance by Chandler (1990) in his description and comparison of 
economic growth in the UK and the US from 1870 to 1948. Second, looking at the post-WW II 
experience, macroeconomic stability differs in the period before and after 1973. According to 
Boltho (1982) and Maddison (1991), this may explain to a large extent the difference in growth 
performance across these periods, leaving less mileage for the catch-up hypothesis. Although 
this proposition seems exaggerated and the causality could perhaps be reversed, business cycles  
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and the resulting uncertainties after 1973 may be partly responsible for a failure to realize what 
may  have  been  left  in  terms  of  a  potential  for  catch  up.  Uncertainty  may  lead  to  a  lower 
investment ratio, but that would not be enough to explain the irrelevance of catching up after 
1973. To explain what is at stake one has to assume that firms invested relatively less heavily in 
risky up-front technological improvements in times of higher uncertainty. 
 
Extension  of  the  core  sample  by  including  post-war  data  for  another  eight  countries  as  in 
Maddision (1991)
22 leads to a significant but still small constant term as shown by regression 
equation (3) in Table 2. The coefficient of the investment ratio declines compared with that of 
equation (2), so that investment is less productive in the larger sample (N=84). Inspection of the 
residuals reveals that the problem is mainly due to the relatively weak growth performance of 
the Scandinavian countries. 
 
Introducing a dummy variable for the set of Scandinavian countries brings the result more in 
line with the smaller sample (N=57), as appears to be the case in equation (4)
23. The question of 
why the Scandinavian countries underperform must here, to a large extent, be left unanswered. 
Boltho (1982) explains sharply above-average investment ratios in Finland and Norway by their 
very low population densities which require much higher infrastructure investment and by the 
composition of their industrial output, heavily concentrated in highly capital-intensive semi-
manufactures. However this may be, our growth equation (4) compares well with the result 
obtained for a smaller sample of countries, equation (2). This reinforces our earlier conclusion 
that economic expansion in the West can be characterized by a normal pattern of investment and 
growth, which is robust over time and across countries. 
 
If employment is measured in persons instead of in hours, the results are not fundamentally 
different (see Table 3). The coefficient on the growth rate of labour input is somewhat higher, 
because the effects of structural labour time reductions are now not taken into account. The 
growth rate of persons employment correlates almost perfectly with the growth rate of output. 
The higher coefficient on gΡ has a slightly depressing effect on the productivity of investment, 
while the constant term is much lower in this case. There is, consequently, no indication for 
exogenous technological change. Endogenous growth theory explaining technological change as 
a cumulative learning process fits the facts satisfactorily. It remains to be seen which measure of  
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labour input is most suitable for explaining economic growth. Ideally, one would like to have a 
quality-adjusted standard of hours worked. However, lacking such data the robustness of results 
for changes in the measurement of labour input is reassuring, as one would expect that a correct 
measure of labour input sits somewhere between labour input in hours and in persons. 
 
The question may be raised whether our analysis is vulnerable to the critique of De Long (1988) 
with respect to applying the Maddison data set. According to De Long, there may be selection 
bias with respect to countries, because countries with relatively high GDP per capita levels in 
1870 that did not make it in terms of economic growth afterwards are excluded from the sample 
(for instance Argentina, Chile, Spain, Portugal). The original sample is therefore biased, because 
it favours convergence. Moreover, measurement errors of GDP per capita in 1870 create the 
appearance of convergence where it does not exist in reality. Both points are well taken but do 
not  seriously  affect  our  analysis.  Selection  bias  is  not  relevant,  because  we  do  not  study 
convergence since 1870 but rather present an estimate of the fundamental growth equation 
showing that catch up became relevant only after WW II. Measurement errors may play a role, 
but it is unlikely that by taking these into account the conclusion of no catch up in the pre-WW 
II period would be changed. 
 
It is instructive to compare our results with the outcomes obtained by authors studying catching 
up in similar terms, i.e. Scott (1989), Dowrick and Nguyen (1989), and Crafts (1992) (see Table 
4). Scott's results are mainly based on his own data for the US, the UK and Japan starting at 
different years in the 19th century for different countries and ending the estimation period in 
1973. There is a strong emphasis on US data because weights are applied based on country size, 
length  of  the  sub-periods  and  statistical  reliability
24.  The  insignificant  constant  term  is 
suppressed  in  the  regression equation preferred by Scott. An important difference with our 
results is that we found the coefficient of the investment ratio to be stable over time, while Scott 
introduces a dummy variable on σ for the post-WW II period. According to Scott there was an 
autonomous  increase  in  technological  change  (an  upward  shift  of  the  fundamental  growth 
equation) after 1950. This shift can be explained by pointing to an increase in communication 
between  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic  after  the  war.  Such  an  increase  in  communication  and 
exchange of information could have stimulated international knowledge spillovers, thus raising 
the productivity of investment on a world-wide scale. However, there seems to be no need for  
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such an interpretation if one considers a longer post-war time period and if catching up is treated 
in the usual way. Multiplication of the catch up variable by σ as in Scott (1989) detracts from 
catching up
25. This is compensated for by the post-war time dummy on σ. Apart from this, the 
post-war regression coefficients of Scott's equation are remarkably close to the results we found, 
as appears from Table 4.  
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Table 4 
 
Comparion with other regression results 
OLS estimation of g on  Table 2  Scott  Table 3  Dowrick  Crafts 
  (2)  (1989)  (2A)  (1989)  (1992) 
Constant   0.39      -0.13      6.10 
  (1.00)      (0.33)     (5.23) 
Investment ratio (σ)   0.14   0.05     0.12   0.06    0.09 
  (4.33)  (2.01)    (3.68)  (2.54)   (4.69) 
Labour input (gℓ)   0.83   0.90     1.06   0.58    0.86 
  (9.57)  (8.11)    (8.89)  (3.74)   (7.75) 
Catch up (ℓncu1950)  -2.22      -2.73  -2.01   -1.35 
  (7.10)      (7.53)  (9.67)   (4.94) 
Catch up (ℓncu1960)  -3.19      -3.62      
  (7.07)      (6.51)     
σDummy1950-1973 (Scott)     0.08         
    (3.61)         
σℓncuDummy1950-1973  (Scott)    -0.05          
    (3.23)       
Dummy 1950s (Crafts)           1.45 
          (5.27) 
Dummy 1960s (Crafts)           2.28 
            (8.24) 
Reconstruction (Crafts)           1.28 
          (1.72) 
Reconstruction squared (Crafts)          -1.28 
          (2.51) 
Number of observations  57  26    57  24  70 
R-Bar-Squared   0.87   0.89     0.86  0.83   0.83 
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Dowrick and Nguyen (1989) obtain different but significant coefficients for the investment ratio 
and the growth rate of labour input by applying cross-country data from the Summers and 
Heston data set for the period 1950-1985. The constant term is not reported. Catching up relates 
to  the  entire  period  under  consideration.  In  addition,  Dowrick  and  Nguyen  (1989)  test  for 
parameter stability by splitting the sample period into three sub-periods: 1950-1960, 1960-1973 
and 1973-1985. The catch-up variable appears to be significant in all sub-periods, but the coeffi-
cient of the investment ratio becomes insignificant for the last sub-period if coefficients are not 
restricted to being equal across sub-periods.  
 
Crafts (1992) extends the analysis of Dowrick and Nguyen by including data for the sub-periods 
1900-1913 and 1923-1938 (11 countries) based on Maddison (1982). Labour is measured in 
hours worked, which compares with our equation (2) in this respect. Catch up extends over the 
entire post-war period from 1950 to 1988. The catch-up variable has a smaller impact than in 
Dowrick and Nguyen, but part of the higher post-WW II growth performance is explained by 
reconstruction variables à la Dumke (1990). Despite this extension, dummies for the 1950s and 
1960s are required in order to get a good fit. Crafts explains this increase in productivity by 
referring to the possibility of long swings in economic growth, on the one hand, and by the 
impact of trade liberalization in those years, on the other hand. Here, as in Scott, the problem 
seems to be how to reconcile pre-war and post-war data on economic growth. However, the 
problem may well be that catching up in the 1950s and 1960s is not given proper weight by the 
procedure chosen. 
 
The  idea  of  "back  to  normal,"  as  implied  by  our  regression  results,  explains  the  growth 
slowdown after 1973 in the European countries and Japan rather well, as inspection of the 
residuals in Table 5 shows. The slowdown in the US remains nevertheless partly unexplained. 
We predict a US growth rate of 3.5% for the period after 1973, which is too high compared with 
the actual growth rate of 2.7%. In contrast, our predictions for the fifties and sixties are too low. 
A hint of an explanation may be found in the relevance of mutual technological spillovers 
analysed in a different historical context by Inkster (1990). According to this view the US 
economy may have profited from feedback effects related to the catch up in other countries. 
When  catching  up  came  to  an  end  the  US  may  have  suffered  a  decline  in  international 
technological spillovers. There may of course be different reasons for a productivity slowdown  
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in the US, but it remains to be seen whether the negative residual in the last period foreshadows 
a structural deviation from the general pattern of economic growth. What this example reveals is 
that it is rewarding to study in detail country-specific and period-specific deviations from the 
normal growth pattern, even if these deviations are not statistically significant. This holds a 
fortiori in case genuine outliers are found. Fortunately, there are very few of them in the post-
war period. The main exception is German output growth in the 1950s, which is underexplained 
in our main equation (6.1% versus 8%). This "reconstruction" effect for the German economy is 
well documented in Dumke (1990). Looking at a clustering of negative or positive residuals for 
the post-war period as a whole, it can be concluded that France does very well, while UK 
performance lies below average. These results correspond with the findings of Dowrick and 
Nguyen (1989) and Crafts (1992). 
 
Catching up set aside, the relative contribution of investment and employment varies greatly 
between countries and periods. In general the investment ratio has a larger impact than the 
growth rate of employment. In the post-war period, the influence of gℓ is most marked for 
Australia, Canada, the US and Japan. Demographic factors (population growth, migration and 
rising participation rates) may be held responsible for this difference with the European coun-
tries (see Appendix). These observations merely make a start in explaining why growth rates 
differ.  A  more  comprehensive  explanation  should  include  institutional  factors  as  well  as 
differences in national economic policies. Our econometric analysis could serve as a framework 
for a more detailed description of economic growth in individual countries and single periods, 
especially so if the sample for estimating the fundamental growth equation can be extended by 
including more nations as well as additional pre-WW II data. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
This paper makes the case for the idea of a normal pattern of economic growth, which is robust 
over time and across nations if proper account is taken of exceptional situations and special 
circumstances. This idea is reminiscent of a normal pattern of sectoral development analysed by 
Chenery and Syrguin (1975). The advantage of these models is that idiosyncratic developments 
can be detected in a rigorous way. However, too much idiosyncracies may spoil normality. 
There  is  a  delicate  balance  between  exceptions  and  the  rule  in  our  analysis  as  well  as  in  
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Chenery's approach of sectoral developments. From these observations follow two important 
lessons, which set the agenda for further research. First, additional effort should be spent to 
refine  the  estimation  of  the  fundamental  growth  equation.  This  requires  improvement  and 
extension of data, especially with respect to growth before WW II. It could be worthwhile, 
moreover, to consider different subdivisions of time with respect to countries, for which the 
initial and terminal points of business cycles are not synchronized. Second, our analysis could 
be  applied  to  explain  sectoral  growth  rates  and  deviations  from  the  normal  pattern  at  a 
disaggregated  level.  As  developments  on  a  sectoral  level  may  differ  substantially  from  the 
aggregate picture (e.g. Wolff, 1992), such an extension shows great promise.  
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Table 5 
The proximate causes of growth (equation 2) in percentages                 
 
            Period         Actual      Explained by                                            
                               growth         σ             gℓ          other     unexplained 
                               rate (g)                                    factors  
GERMANY 
   1       1870-1890    2.384       1.553        .412                      .028 
   2       1890-1913    3.177       1.908       1.076                   -.196 
   3       1913-1929    1.203       1.612       -.145                    -.653 
   4       1929-1938    3.779       1.324       1.136                     .928 
   5       1950-1960    7.966       2.196        .854      2.684      1.841 
   6       1960-1973    4.373       2.388       -.675      2.513      -.242 
   7       1973-1989    2.051       1.977       -.493                      .177 
JAPAN 
   8       1890-1913    2.505       1.548        .617                     -.050 
   9       1913-1929    3.698       1.973        .207                    1.127 
  10       1929-1938    3.594       1.842       1.002                    .360 
  11       1950-1960    8.827       2.720       2.476     4.239      -.998 
  12       1960-1973    9.606       3.609        .393      5.102      .110 
  13       1973-1989    3.927       3.242        .557                    -.262 
FRANCE 
  14       1870-1890    1.281       1.312       -.083                   -.338 
  15       1890-1913    1.658       1.413       -.082                   -.061 
  16       1913-1929    1.865       1.521       -.419                    .372 
  17       1929-1938    -.394       1.645      -2.641                   .211 
  18       1950-1960    4.566       1.864       -.010      2.023     .299 
  19       1960-1973    5.408       2.308        .101      2.256     .351 
  20       1973-1989    2.324       2.025       -.603                   .513 
NETHERLANDS 
  21       1913-1929    3.647       2.017        .619                     .620 
  22       1929-1938     .327       1.893        .372                   -2.328 
  23       1950-1960    4.611       2.469        .359      1.729     -.337 
  24       1960-1973    4.832       2.686       -.331      1.961     .125 
  25       1973-1989    1.991       1.988       -.289                   -.098 
AUSTRALIA 
  26       1870-1890    4.495        .950       3.611                    -.456 
  27       1890-1913    2.561        .797        .544                      .828 
  28       1913-1929    1.291        .938        .009                    -.045 
  29       1929-1938    2.057        .801        .765                     .099 
  30       1938-1950    3.481        .773       1.053      2.194    -.930 
  31       1950-1960    4.043       1.454       1.024       .891     .283 
  32       1960-1973    5.210       1.521       2.148      1.183    -.032 
  33       1973-1989    3.125       1.405       1.264                    .066 
UNITED KINGDOM 
  34       1870-1890    2.048        .905        .513                     .238 
  35       1890-1913    1.763        .951        .588                   -.167 
  36       1913-1929    .7051        .719       -.614                    .209 
  37       1929-1938    1.895        .806        .805                   -.106 
  38       1938-1950    1.626        .754       -.508      1.173    -.183 
  39       1950-1960    2.865       1.530        .460      1.250    -.766 
  40       1960-1973    3.159       1.930       -.579      1.850    -.431 
  41       1973-1989    1.949       1.896       -.099                   -.237  
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CANADA 
  42       1870-1890    3.061       1.516       1.220                  -.065 
  43       1890-1913    4.952       2.068       1.640                   .853 
  44       1913-1929    2.797       1.848        .999                  -.440 
  45       1929-1938    -.035       1.407       -.127                -1.705 
  46       1938-1950    5.779       1.454        .379      2.263  1.293 
  47       1950-1960    4.581       2.373       1.205       .653  -.041 
  48       1960-1973    5.446       2.408       2.115       .746  -.212 
  49       1973-1989    3.601       2.174       1.498                -.460 
UNITED STATES 
  50       1870-1890    3.983       1.327       1.974                  .292 
  51       1890-1913    3.897       1.484       1.364                   .658 
  52       1913-1929    3.100       1.533        .544                    .632 
  53       1929-1938    -.708       1.333      -1.760                 -.671 
  54       1938-1950    5.076       1.360       1.525      2.117  -.316 
  55       1950-1960    3.252       1.703        .637                   .522 
  56       1960-1973    3.951       1.764       1.222                  .574 
  57       1973-1989    2.671       1.799       1.265                 -.783 
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Appendix 
I Observations (1870-1989) with labour input man-hours 
 
            Period            g              gℓ             g-gℓ            σ                cu 
                                               (hours) 
GERMANY 
   1        1870.0      2.3841      .49382      1.8903     11.4690      .50664   
   2        1890.0      3.1777      1.2895      1.8881     14.0838      .53747   
   3        1913.0      1.2037     -.17426      1.3780     11.9000      .49533   
   4        1929.0      3.7793      1.3616      2.4177      9.7778      .41991   
   5        1950.0      7.9662      1.0239      6.9422     16.2100      .29890   
   6        1960.0      4.3739     -.81003      5.1839     17.6308      .45520   
   7        1973.0      2.0517     -.59095      2.6426     14.5933      .64432   
JAPAN 
   8        1890.0      2.5055      .74031      1.7652     11.4261      .20537   
   9        1913.0      3.6986      .24828      3.4503     14.5688      .18454   
  10        1929.0      3.5948      1.2009      2.3939     13.6000      .21589   
  11        1950.0      8.8279      2.9677      5.8602     20.0800      .14849   
  12        1960.0      9.6061      .47124      9.1349     26.6385      .20236   
  13        1973.0      3.9275      .66769      3.2598     23.9333      .45784   
FRANCE 
  14        1870.0      1.2814    -.099901      1.3813      9.6900      .55896   
  15        1890.0      1.6585    -.099296      1.7578     10.4315      .53757   
  16        1913.0      1.8650     -.50290      2.3679     11.2312      .48387   
  17        1929.0     -.39467     -3.1654      2.7707     12.1444      .47990   
  18        1950.0      4.5667    -.013043      4.5798     13.7600      .40235   
  19        1960.0      5.4083      .12156      5.2868     17.0385      .49334   
  20        1973.0      2.3247     -.72308      3.0478     14.9467      .70299   
NETHERLANDS 
  21        1913.0      3.6475      .74220      2.9053     14.8890      .68950   
  22        1929.0      .32759      .44612     -.11853     13.9778      .73975   
  23        1950.0      4.6110      .43036      4.1806     18.2300      .45934   
  24        1960.0      4.8323     -.39691      5.2293     19.8308      .54112   
  25        1973.0      1.9910     -.34683      2.3378     14.6800      .76820   
AUSTRALIA 
  26        1870.0      4.4953      4.3279      .16740     12.7800      1.3228   
  27        1890.0      2.5610      .65284      1.9082     10.7217      .99820   
  28        1913.0      1.2919     .011004      1.2809     12.6125      .92655   
  29        1929.0      2.0571      .91795      1.1392     10.7780      .77321   
  30        1938.0      3.4814      1.2624      2.2190     10.4083      .75265   
  31        1950.0      4.0439      1.2279      2.8160     19.5600      .66969   
  32        1960.0      5.2100      2.5742      2.6359     20.4615      .69037   
  33        1973.0      3.1255      1.5149      1.6106     18.9000      .70084   
UNITED KINGDOM 
  34        1870.0      2.0480      .61521      1.4328      6.6850      1.0446   
  35        1890.0      1.7631      .70562      1.0575      7.0261      1.0129   
  36        1913.0      .70519     -.73580      1.4410      5.3125      .77619   
  37        1929.0      1.8953      .96470      .93060      5.9556      .66544   
  38        1938.0      1.6262     -.60890      2.2351      5.5667      .63590   
  39        1950.0      2.8657      .55225      2.3134     11.3000      .56964   
  40        1960.0      3.1595     -.69452      3.8541     14.2462      .56031   
  41        1973.0      1.9497     -.11963      2.0693     14.0000      .67095   
CANADA 
  42        1870.0      3.0619      1.4632      1.5987     11.1900      .64243   
  43        1890.0      4.9520      1.9660      2.9861     15.2652      .64180   
  44        1913.0      2.7977      1.1983      1.5993     13.6437      .75124   
  45        1929.0    -.035769     -.15312      .11735     10.3889      .65725   
  46        1938.0      5.7797      .45457      5.3251     10.7333      .58444   
  47        1950.0      4.5812      1.4444      3.1368     17.5200      .74516   
  48        1960.0      5.4467      2.5346      2.9122     17.7769      .79167   
  49        1973.0      3.6018      1.7955      1.8063     16.0467      .83166    
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UNITED STATES 
  50        1870.0      3.9836      2.3656      1.6180      9.7950      1.0000   
  51        1890.0      3.8979      1.6351      2.2627     10.9565      1.0000   
  52        1913.0      3.1007      .65237      2.4484     11.3187      1.0000   
  53        1929.0     -.70822     -2.1101      1.4019      9.8444      1.0000   
  54        1938.0      5.0766      1.8276      3.2490     10.0417      1.0000   
  55        1950.0      3.2527      .76402      2.4887     12.5700      1.0000   
  56        1960.0      3.9517      1.4648      2.4869     13.0231      1.0000   
  57        1973.0      2.6713      1.5170      1.1543     13.2800      1.0000   
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II Observations (1870-1989) with labour input persons 
 
 
             Period          g               gℓ             g-gℓ             σ             cu 
                                              (persons) 
 
GERMANY 
   1        1870.0      2.3841      .80437      1.5797     11.4690      .50271   
   2        1890.0      3.1777      1.5881      1.5895     14.0838      .53284   
   3        1913.0      1.2037      .59869      .60506     11.9000      .49134   
   4        1929.0      3.7793      1.2050      2.5743      9.7778      .40951   
   5        1950.0      7.9662      2.1106      5.8555     16.2100      .37078   
   6        1960.0      4.3739      .28587      4.0880     17.6308      .52773   
   7        1973.0      2.0517      .13011      1.9215     14.5933      .67697   
JAPAN 
   8        1890.0      2.5055      1.0384      1.4671     11.4261      .20397   
   9        1913.0      3.6986      .81711      2.8815     14.5688      .18334   
  10        1929.0      3.5948      1.0733      2.5215     13.6000      .21792   
  11        1950.0      8.8279      2.2717      6.5562     20.0800      .17227   
  12        1960.0      9.6061      1.2635      8.3426     26.6385      .26132   
  13        1973.0      3.9275      .96038      2.9672     23.9333      .55810   
FRANCE 
  14        1870.0      1.2814      .20657      1.0748      9.6900      .55537   
  15        1890.0      1.6585      .19633      1.4622     10.4315      .53391   
  16        1913.0      1.8650      .24163      1.6234     11.2312      .48071   
  17        1929.0     -.39467     -.79670      .40202     12.1444      .47068   
  18        1950.0      4.5667     .023370      4.5433     13.7600      .41507   
  19        1960.0      5.4083      .74160      4.6667     17.0385      .52742   
  20        1973.0      2.3247      .13573      2.1890     14.9467      .72510   
NETHERLANDS 
  21        1913.0      3.6475      1.6407      2.0068     14.8890      .68950   
  22        1929.0      .32759      .52545     -.19786     13.9778      .71385   
  23        1950.0      4.6110      1.1739      3.4371     18.2300      .54323   
  24        1960.0      4.8323      .82213      4.0102     19.8308      .61829   
  25        1973.0      1.9910      1.1153      .87570     14.6800      .78341   
AUSTRALIA 
  26        1870.0      4.4953      4.6480     -.15265     12.7800      1.3144   
  27        1890.0      2.5610      .95069      1.6103     10.7217      .99140   
  28        1913.0      1.2919      1.2092     .082769     12.6125      .92050   
  29        1929.0      2.0571      1.0711      .98598     10.7780      .70619   
  30        1938.0      3.4814      2.4337      1.0477     10.4083      .77017   
  31        1950.0      4.0439      1.6274      2.4165     19.5600      .65929   
  32        1960.0      5.2100      2.8425      2.3675     20.4615      .67960   
  33        1973.0      3.1255      1.8080      1.3175     18.9000      .69716   
UNITED KINGDOM 
  34        1870.0      2.0480      .92330      1.1247      6.6850      1.0517   
  35        1890.0      1.7631      1.0012      .76185      7.0261      1.0194   
  36        1913.0      .70519      .12341      .58178      5.3125      .78185   
  37        1929.0      1.8953      1.0584      .83693      5.9556      .64953   
  38        1938.0      1.6262      .61222      1.0140      5.5667      .69912   
  39        1950.0      2.8657      .78632      2.0793     11.3000      .59741   
  40        1960.0      3.1595      .26594      2.8936     14.2462      .59714   
  41        1973.0      1.9497      .40612      1.5436     14.0000      .65961   
CANADA 
  42        1870.0      3.0619      1.7724      1.2895     11.1900      .64243   
  43        1890.0      4.9520      2.2690      2.6830     15.2652      .64180   
  44        1913.0      2.7977      1.7207      1.0769     13.6437      .75124   
  45        1929.0    -.035769      .61057     -.64634     10.3889      .67324   
  46        1938.0      5.7797      1.5485      4.2313     10.7333      .63489   
  47        1950.0      4.5812      1.9206      2.6606     17.5200      .78507   
  48        1960.0      5.4467      2.9184      2.5283     17.7769      .82783   
  49        1973.0      3.6018      2.2193      1.3824     16.0467      .86605    
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UNITED STATES 
  50        1870.0      3.9836      2.6776      1.3060      9.7950      1.0000   
  51        1890.0      3.8979      1.9372      1.9607     10.9565      1.0000   
  52        1913.0      3.1007      1.3241      1.7766     11.3187      1.0000   
  53        1929.0     -.70822     -.71534    .0071223      9.8444      1.0000   
  54        1938.0      5.0766      2.6741      2.4025     10.0417      1.0000   
  55        1950.0      3.2527      1.1611      2.0916     12.5700      1.0000   
  56        1960.0      3.9517      1.8121      2.1396     13.0231      1.0000   
  57        1973.0      2.6713      1.9499      .72140     13.2800      1.0000   
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III Participation rates (Part) and annual hours worked per person (Hours)
26 
 
            Year 1        Year 2      Part in      Part in       Hours in     Hours in 
                                                year 1       year 2        year 1         year 2 
 
GERMANY 
   1        1870.0      1890.0     26.1528     24.4573      2.9410      2.7650   
   2        1890.0      1913.0     24.4573     25.8339      2.7650      2.5840   
   3        1913.0      1929.0     25.8339     29.4058      2.5840      2.2840   
   4        1929.0      1938.0     29.4058     30.9286      2.2840      2.3160   
   5        1950.0      1960.0     42.3424     47.0478      2.3160      2.0810   
   6        1960.0      1973.0     47.0478     43.6717      2.0810      1.8040   
   7        1973.0      1989.0     43.6717     44.5798      1.8040      1.6070   
JAPAN 
   8        1890.0      1913.0     50.6650     49.8355      2.7700      2.5880   
   9        1913.0      1929.0     49.8355     46.3791      2.5880      2.3640   
  10        1929.0      1938.0     46.3791     44.9227      2.3640      2.3910   
  11        1950.0      1960.0     43.0434     47.8983      2.1660      2.3180   
  12        1960.0      1973.0     47.8983     48.3987      2.3180      2.0930   
  13        1973.0      1989.0     48.3987     49.7742      2.0930      1.9980   
FRANCE 
  14        1870.0      1890.0     46.3059     48.3325      2.9450      2.7700   
  15        1890.0      1913.0     48.3325     48.7956      2.7700      2.5880   
  16        1913.0      1929.0     48.7956     48.9207      2.5880      2.2970   
  17        1929.0      1938.0     48.9207     44.7307      2.2970      1.8480   
  18        1950.0      1960.0     47.0002     43.1420      1.9260      1.9190   
  19        1960.0      1973.0     43.1420     41.6286      1.9190      1.7710   
  20        1973.0      1989.0     41.6286     39.4801      1.7710      1.5430   
NETHERLANDS 
  21        1913.0      1929.0     37.8001     38.8461      2.6050      2.2600   
  22        1929.0      1938.0     38.8461     36.4882      2.2600      2.2440   
  23        1950.0      1960.0     40.7356     40.3099      2.2080      2.0510   
  24        1960.0      1973.0     40.3099     38.3213      2.0510      1.7510   
  25        1973.0      1989.0     38.3213     41.4169      1.7510      1.3870   
AUSTRALIA 
  26        1870.0      1890.0     38.8889     50.3058      2.9450      2.7700   
  27        1890.0      1913.0     50.3058     40.3028      2.7700      2.5880   
  28        1913.0      1929.0     40.3028     36.8199      2.5880      2.1390   
  29        1929.0      1938.0     36.8199     37.5435      2.1390      2.1100   
  30        1938.0      1950.0     37.5435     42.3016      2.1100      1.8380   
  31        1950.0      1960.0     42.3016     39.5620      1.8380      1.7670   
  32        1960.0      1973.0     39.5620     43.3321      1.7670      1.7080   
  33        1973.0      1989.0     43.3321     46.3078      1.7080      1.6310   
UNITED KINGDOM 
  34        1870.0      1890.0     39.1329     39.3864      2.9840      2.8070   
  35        1890.0      1913.0     39.3864     40.6712      2.8070      2.6240   
  36        1913.0      1929.0     40.6712     41.4609      2.6240      2.2860   
  37        1929.0      1938.0     41.4609     43.8329      2.2860      2.2670   
  38        1938.0      1950.0     43.8329     44.4771      2.2670      1.9580   
  39        1950.0      1960.0     44.4771     46.2547      1.9580      1.9130   
  40        1960.0      1973.0     46.2547     44.6113      1.9130      1.6880   
  41        1973.0      1989.0     44.6113     46.7468      1.6880      1.5520   
CANADA 
  42        1870.0      1890.0     34.7707     37.5339      2.9640      2.7890   
  43        1890.0      1913.0     37.5339     39.3832      2.7890      2.6050   
  44        1913.0      1929.0     39.3832     39.4265      2.6050      2.3990   
  45        1929.0      1938.0     39.4265     37.4754      2.3990      2.2400   
  46        1938.0      1950.0     37.4754     36.6164      2.2400      1.9670   
  47        1950.0      1960.0     36.6164     33.9717      1.9670      1.8770   
  48        1960.0      1973.0     33.9717     40.0643      1.8770      1.7880   
  49        1973.0      1989.0     40.0643     47.8665      1.7880      1.6730    
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UNITED STATES 
  50        1870.0      1890.0     36.8876     39.5997      2.9640      2.7890   
  51        1890.0      1913.0     39.5997     39.9282      2.7890      2.6050   
  52        1913.0      1929.0     39.9282     39.3488      2.6050      2.3420   
  53        1929.0      1938.0     39.3488     34.5598      2.3420      2.0620   
  54        1938.0      1950.0     34.5598     40.4877      2.0620      1.8670   
  55        1950.0      1960.0     40.4877     38.2989      1.8670      1.7950   
  56        1960.0      1973.0     38.2989     41.2399      1.7950      1.7170   






1.  We are grateful to Angus Maddison for providing us with a data diskette on time series of investment 
ratios. We should also like to thank Sjak Smulders and the participants of the CEPR Workshop "Inter-
preting Economic Growth" in Berlin (June 1993) for useful comments on an earlier version of the paper. 
2.  To illustrate his point, Scott (1989) mentions replacements for a fleet of taxis which are included in gross 
investment, because they are lumpy, whereas they should be included in maintenance. 
3.   As  shown  in  Diederen  (1993),  the  Kamien-Schwartz  model  can  easily  be  adapted  to  a  model  of 
endogenous growth similar in spirit to the model of Scott. 
4.   Scott (1989) accounts for catch up in a somewhat different manner by premultiplying the catch-up variable 
in equation (4) by σ. This result comes from the specification of the growth equation as an investment 
programme contour that shifts along a radius under the impact of different factors (dummies, catch up, 
etc.). 
5.  Sub-periods should be of approximately equal length to allow for a uniform impact of catching up across 
the sample. 
6.  From Maddison (1991): Table A.2, Gross Domestic Product in 1985 US Relative Prices (adjusted to 
exclude impact of boundary changes), Table C.8, Total Employment, 1870-1989 and Table C.9, Annual 
Hours Worked per Person, 1870-1989. From Maddison (1992): Gross Non-Residential Fixed Investment 
as % of GDP, 1870-1988. The missing figures for France (1870-1938) were derived by scaling the time 
series for Gross Fixed Investment as % of GDP. The missing figures for Germany (1870-1924) were 
obtained by adjusting the series of Hoffman (1965) to that of Maddison. The investment ratio for the 
Netherlands (1913-1929) is the average of 1921-1929. The investment ratios of the sample are the annual 
averages  of  1871-1890,  1891-1913,  1914-1929,  1930-1938,  1939-1950,  1951-1960,  1961-1973  and 
1974-1988.       
7.  Alternatively, trend growth rates of employment and output could be estimated by, for instance, piecewice 
linear trend regression. Complete time series for employment are lacking, however, so that we have to rely 
on comparing peak levels.  
8.  The data of the core sample are presented in the Appendix.  
9.  There are only three out of 57 cases with negative output growth: France, Canada and the US in the 1930s. 
See Appendix.  
10.  The bottom of the table shows the F-statistics of the Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation, 
the Ramsey RESET test using the square of the fitted values as additional explanatory variable and a test 
on heteroscedasticity based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values.  
11.  White's  heteroscedasticity-consistent  t-statistics  (not  reported  here)  deviate  only  slightly  from  the  t-
statistics in the tables.   
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12.  This holds for equation (1) in Table 2. For equation (1A) in Table 3, the coefficient of the investment ratio 
is significant at the 0.01 probability level.  
13.  Potential additional variables are human capital accumulation and the share of exports in GDP. The impact 
of human capital could not be tested because adequate proxi variables are not easy available before WW 
II. The share of exports in GDP proved to be statistically highly insignificant and of the wrong sign. In this 
connection it should be recalled that the growth equation (3) is concave in σ and gΡ. However, both 
investment ratio squared and labour input growth squared are not significant. 
14.   To check for a simultaneous equation bias equation (2) in Table 2 is reestimated by applying 2SLS. This 
results in: g = 0.24 + 0.15σ + 0.83gΡ - 2.17Ρncu1950 - 3.08Ρncu1960 + 0.21σD38-50 - 0.06σDaus,R 
2 = 0.87. As 
the differences with OLS estimation in Table 2 are very minor no further use is made of instrumental 
variables.   
15.   Gross  Non-Residential  Fixed  Investment  comes  from  adding  the  time  series  on  Public  Works  and 
Machinery Equipment in current prices. This is related to GDP at market prices from the same paper. The 
average investment ratios are 8.4 (1890-1913), 10.7 (1913-1929), 11.3 (1929-1938), 14.2 (1950-1960), 
15.3 (1960-1973) and 16.0 (1973-1989). 
16.  Source: OECD (1970), (1990) and (1992).   
17.   This hypothesis was suggested by N. Crafts in discussing an earlier version of the paper. 
18.   For  each  sub-period  the  (initial)  Secondary  Enrollment  Rate  is  the  ratio  of  the  number  of  pupils  in 
secondary schools and population in age group 15-19 calculated from Mitchell (1982, 1992, 1993). For 
Canada SEC is approximated by the US enrollment rates.            
19.  This is reduced to 82% in case of g-gΡ as independent variable. Other empirical growth studies (Barro, 
1991; Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992) explain g-gΡ instead of g. This reduces the t-value for gΡ (t=1.89) 
on the RHS of equation (2). In case of equation (2A) the coefficient of gΡ then becomes insignificant 
(t=0.50). This result (population growth is not robust), which is stressed by Levine and Renelt (1992), 
actually depends on measuring labour input growth in persons and choosing labour productivity as the 
variable that has to be explained.     
20.  Robustness of the results here refers to the tests reported in section 3. 
21.  If the Australian economy is included without a dummy, the constant term in the regression equation and 
its t- value become higher as should be the case when observations relating to a lower growth curve are 
combined with observations relating to the normal pattern. 
22.  Notice that for Italy also pre-war data have been added to the core sample. 
23.  The dummy is one in each postwar subperiod (multiplied by σ) for Denmark, Norway, Sweden and 
Finland  and  zero  for  the  other  countries.  As  explained  in  note  18,  the  introduction  of  dummies  for 
underperforming countries reduces also the constant term. 
24.  Scott  defends  this  by  pointing  at  heteroscedasticity  in  the  unweighted  regression.  Testing  for 
heteroscedasticity of our results does not reveal serious problems of this kind (see section 3). 
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25.  Applying Scott's procedure to our data (1870-1973) results in: 
  g = 0.175 + 0.166σ + 0.817gℓ - 0.106σℓncu50 - 0.119σℓncu60 + 0.20σD38-50 - 0.07σDAus 
                    (0.33)    (3.62)     (7.89)     (-4.98)             (-4.66)                (4.50)          (-2.88) 
  86 . 0
2 = R   49 = N  
 
  All coefficients are significant except the constant term. As appears from this equation, the influence of 
catching up on growth is reduced substantially. It is about 20% of the impact in our equation (1). 
26.  Part / Total Employment (persons)/Total Population. 